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Abstract
In this paper, we improve the previously best known regret
bound to achieve -differential privacy in oblivious adversarial
bandits from O(T 2/3/) to O(√T lnT/). This is achieved
by combining a Laplace Mechanism with EXP3. We show that
though EXP3 is already differentially private, it leaks a linear
amount of information in T . However, we can improve this
privacy by relying on its intrinsic exponential mechanism for
selecting actions. This allows us to reach O(√lnT )-DP, with
a regret of O(T 2/3) that holds against an adaptive adversary,
an improvement from the best known of O(T 3/4). This is
done by using an algorithm that run EXP3 in a mini-batch
loop. Finally, we run experiments that clearly demonstrate the
validity of our theoretical analysis.
1 Introduction
We consider multi-armed bandit problems in the adversarial
setting whereby an agent selects one from a number of alter-
natives (called arms) at each round and receives a gain that
depends on its choice. The agent’s goal is to maximize its to-
tal gain over time. There are two main settings for the bandit
problem. In the stochastic one, the gains of each arm are gen-
erated i.i.d by some unknown probability law. In the adversar-
ial setting, which is the focus of this paper, the gains are gen-
erated adversarially. We are interested in finding algorithms
with a total gain over T rounds not much smaller than that of
an oracle with additional knowledge about the problem. In
both settings, algorithms that achieve the optimal (problem-
independent) regret bound ofO(√T ) are known (Auer, Cesa-
Bianchi, and Fischer 2002; Burnetas and Katehakis 1996;
Pandey and Olston 2006; Thompson 1933; Auer et al. 2003;
Auer 2002; Agrawal and Goyal 2012).
This problem is a model for many applications where there
is a need for trading-off exploration and exploitation. This
is so because, whenever we make a choice, we only observe
the gain generated by that choice, and not the gains that we
could have obtained otherwise. An example is clinical trials,
where arms correspond to different treatments or tests, and
the goal is to maximize the number of cured patients over
time while being uncertain about the effects of treatments.
Other problems, such as search engine advertisement and
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movie recommendations can be formalized similarly (Pandey
and Olston 2006).
Privacy can be a serious issue in the bandit setting (c.f.
(Jain, Kothari, and Thakurta 2012; Thakurta and Smith 2013;
Mishra and Thakurta 2015; Zhao et al. 2014)). For example,
in clinical trials, we may want to detect and publish results
about the best drug without leaking sensitive information,
such as the patient’s health condition and genome. Differen-
tial privacy (Dwork 2006) formally bounds the amount of
information that a third party can learn no matter their power
or side information.
Differential privacy has been used before in the stochastic
setting (Tossou and Dimitrakakis 2016; Mishra and Thakurta
2015; Jain, Kothari, and Thakurta 2012) where the authors
obtain optimal algorithms up to logarithmic factors. In the
adversarial setting, (Thakurta and Smith 2013) adapts an
algorithm called Follow The Approximate Leader to make it
private and obtain a regret bound of O(T 2/3). In this work,
we show that a number of simple algorithms can satisfy
privacy guarantees, while achieving nearly optimal regret (up
to logarithmic factors) that scales naturally with the level of
privacy desired.
Our work is also of independent interest for non-private
multi-armed bandit algorithms, as there are competitive with
the current state of the art against switching-cost adversaries
(where we recover the optimal bound). Finally, we provide
rigorous empirical results against a variety of adversaries.
The following section gives the main background and nota-
tions. Section 3.1 describes meta-algorithms that perturb the
gain sequence to achieve privacy, while Section 3.2 explains
how to leverage the privacy inherent in the EXP3 algorithm
by modifying the way gains are used. Section 4 compares
our algorithms with EXP3 in a variety of settings. The full
proofs of all our main results are in the full version.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Multi-Armed Bandit problem
Formally, a bandit game is defined between an adversary and
an agent as follows: there is a set of K arms A, and at each
round t, the agent plays an arm It ∈ A. Given the choice
It, the adversary grants the agent a gain gIt,t ∈ [0, 1]. The
agent only observes the gain of arm It, and not that of any
other arms. The goal of this agent is to maximize its total gain
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after T rounds,
∑T
t=1 gIt,t. A randomized bandit algorithm
Λ : (A× [0, 1])∗ → D(A) maps every arm-gain history to a
distribution over the next arm to take.
The nature of the adversary, and specifically, how the gains
are generated, determines the nature of the game. For the
stochastic adversary (Thompson 1933; Auer, Cesa-Bianchi,
and Fischer 2002), the gain obtained at round t is generated
i.i.d from a distribution PIt . The more general fully obliv-
ious adversary (Audibert and Bubeck 2010) generates the
gains independently at round t but not necessarily identically
from a distribution PIt,t. Finally, we have the oblivious adver-
sary (Auer et al. 2003) whose only constraint is to generate
the gain gIt,t as a function of the current action It only, i.e.
ignoring previous actions and gains.
While focusing on oblivious adversaries, we discovered
that by targeting differential privacy we can also compete
against the stronger m-bounded memory adaptive adversary
(Cesa-Bianchi, Dekel, and Shamir 2013; Merhav et al. 2002;
Dekel, Tewari, and Arora 2012) who can use up to the last m
gains. The oblivious adversary is a special case with m = 0.
Another special case of this adversary is the one with switch-
ing costs, who penalises the agent whenever he switches
arms, by giving the lowest possible gain of 0 (here m = 1).
Regret. Relying on the cumulative gain of an agent to eval-
uate its performance can be misleading. Indeed, consider the
case where an adversary gives a zero gain for all arms at ev-
ery round. The cumulative gain of the agent would look bad
but no other agents could have done better. This is why one
compares the gap between the agent’s cumulative gain and
the one obtained by some hypothetical agent, called oracle,
with additional information or computational power. This
gap is called the regret.
There are also variants of the oracle that are considered in
the literature. The most common variant is the fixed oracle,
which always plays the best fixed arm in hindsight. The regret
R against this oracle is :
R = max
i=1,...K
T∑
t=1
gi,t −
T∑
t=1
gIt,t
In practice, we either prove a high probability bound onR or
an expected value ER with:
ER = E
[
max
i=1,...K
T∑
t=1
gi,t −
T∑
t=1
gIt,t
]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random
choices of both the agent and adversary. There are other
oracles like the shifting oracle but those are out of scope of
this paper.
EXP3. The Exponential-weight for Exploration and Ex-
ploitation (EXP3 (Auer et al. 2003)) algorithm achieves the
optimal bound (up to logarithmic factors) of O(√TK lnK)
for the weak regret (i.e. the expected regret compared to the
fixed oracle) against an oblivious adversary. EXP3 simply
maintains an estimate G˜i,t for the cumulative gain of arm i
up to round t with G˜i,t =
∑t
s=1
gi,t
pi,t
1It=i where
pi,t = (1− γ) exp (γ/KG˜i,t)∑K
i=1 exp (γ/KG˜i,t)
+
γ
K
(2.1)
with γ a well defined constant.
Finally, EXP3 plays one action randomly according to
the probability distribution pt = {p1,t, . . . pK,t} with pi,t as
defined above.
2.2 Differential Privacy
The following definition (from (Tossou and Dimitrakakis
2016)) specifies what is meant when we called a bandit algo-
rithm differentially private at a single round t:
Definition 2.1 (Single round (, δ)-differentially private ban-
dit algorithm). A randomized bandit algorithm Λ is (, δ)-
differentially private at round t, if for all sequence g1:t−1
and g′1:t−1 that differs in at most one round, we have for any
action subset S ⊆ A:
PΛ(It ∈ S | g1:t−1) ≤ δ + PΛ(It ∈ S | g′1:t−1)e, (2.2)
where PΛ denotes the probability distribution specified by
the algorithm and g1:t−1 = {g1, . . . gt−1} with gs the gains
of all arms at round s. When δ = 0, the algorithm is said to
be -differential private.
The  and δ parameters quantify the amount of privacy
loss. Lower (,δ) indicate higher privacy and consequently
we will also refer to (,δ) as the privacy loss. Definition 2.1
means that the output of the bandit algorithm at round t is
almost insensible to any single change in the gains sequence.
This implies that whether or not we remove a single round,
replace the gains, the bandit algorithm will still play almost
the same action. Assuming the gains at round t are linked
to a user private data (for example his cancer status or the
advertisement he clicked), the definition preserves the privacy
of that user against any third parties looking at the output.
This is the case because the choices or the participation of
that user would not almost affect the output. Equation (2.2)
specifies how much the output is affected by a single user.
We would like Definition 2.1 to hold for all rounds, so as
to protect the privacy of all users. If it does for some (, δ),
then we say the algorithm has per-round or instantaneous
privacy loss (, δ). Such an algorithm also has a cumulative
privacy loss of at most (′, δ′) with ′ = T and δ′ = δT
after T steps. Our goal is to design bandit algorithm such that
their cumulative privacy loss (′, δ′) are as low as possible
while achieving simultaneously a very low regret. In practice,
we would like ′ and the regret to be sub-linear while δ′
should be a very small quantity. Definition 2.2 formalizes
clearly the meaning of this cumulative privacy loss and for
ease of presentation, we will ignore the term ”cumulative”
when referring to it.
Definition 2.2 ((, δ)-differentially private bandit algorithm).
A randomized bandit algorithm Λ is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate up to round t, if for all g1:t−1 and g′1:t−1 that differs in
at most one round, we have for any action subset S ⊆ At:
PΛ(I1:t ∈ S | g1:t−1) ≤ δ + PΛ(I1:t ∈ S | g′1:t−1)e,
(2.3)
where PΛ and g are as defined in Definition 2.1.
Most of the time, we will refer to Definition 2.2 and when-
ever we need to use Definition 2.1, this will be made explicit.
The simplest mechanism to achieve differential privacy for
a function is to add Laplace noise of scale proportional to its
sensitivity. The sensitivity is the maximum amount by which
the value of the function can change if we change a single
element in the inputs sequence. For example, if the input is
a stream of numbers in [0, 1] and the function their sum, we
can add Laplace noise of scale 1 to each number and achieve
-differential privacy with an error of O(√T/) in the sum.
However, (Chan, Shi, and Song 2010) introduced Hybrid
Mechanism, which achieves -differential privacy with only
poly-logarithmic error (with respect to the true sum). The
idea is to group the stream of numbers in a binary tree and
only add a Laplace noise at the nodes of the tree.
As demonstrated above, the main challenge with differen-
tial privacy is thus to trade-off optimally privacy and utility.
Notation. In this paper, i will be used as an index for an
arbitrary arm in [1,K], while k will be used to indicate an
optimal arm and It is the arm played by an agent at round
t. We use gi,t to indicate the gain of the i-th arm at round t.
RΛ(T ) is the regret of the algorithm Λ after T rounds. The
index and T are dropped when it is clear from the context.
Unless otherwise specified, the regret is defined for oblivious
adversaries against the fixed oracle. We use ”x ∼ P ” to
denote that x is generated from distribution P . Lap(λ) is
used to denote the Laplace distribution with scale λ while
Bern (p) denotes the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p.
3 Algorithms and Analysis
3.1 DP-Λ-Lap: Differential privacy through
additional noise
We start by showing that the obvious technique to achieve
a given -differential privacy in adversarial bandits already
beat the state-of-the art. The main idea is to use any base
bandit algorithm Λ as input and add a Laplace noise of scale
1
 to each gain before Λ observes it. This technique gives
-DP differential privacy as the gains are bounded in [0, 1]
and the noises are added i.i.d at each round.
However, bandits algorithms require bounded gains while
the noisy gains are not. The trick is to ignore rounds where the
noisy gains fall outside an interval of the form [−b, b+1]. We
pick the threshold b such that, with high probability, the noisy
gains will be inside the interval [−b, b+ 1]. More precisely,
b can be chosen such that with high probability, the number
of rounds ignored is lower than the upper bound RΛ on the
regret of Λ. Given that in the standard bandit problem, the
gains are bounded in [0, 1], the gains at accepted rounds are
rescaled back to [0, 1].
Theorem 3.2 shows that all these operations still preserve
-DP while Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that the upper bound
on the expected regret of DP-Λ-Lap adds some small addi-
tional terms to RΛ. To illustrate how small those additional
terms are, we instantiate DP-Λ-Lap with the EXP3 algorithm.
This leads to a mechanism called DP-EXP3-Lap described
in Algorithm 1. With a carefully chosen threshold b, corol-
lary 3.1 implies that the additional terms are such that the
expected regret of DP-EXP3-Lap is O(√T lnT/) which is
optimal in T up to some logarithmic factors. This result is a
significant improvement over the best known bound so far
of O(T 2/3/) from (Thakurta and Smith 2013) and solves
simultaneously the challenge (whether or not one can get
-DP mechanism with optimal regret) posed by the authors.
Algorithm 1 DP-EXP3-Lap
Let G˜i = 0 for all arms and b = lnT , γ =
√
K lnK
(e−1)T
for each round t = 1, · · · , T do
Compute the probability distribution p over the arms
with p = (p1,t, · · · pK,t) and pi,t as in eq (2.1).
Draw an arm It from the probability distribution p.
Receive the reward gIt,t
Let the noisy gain be g′It,t = gIt,t +NIt,t
with NIt,t ∼ Lap( 1 )
if g′It,t ∈ [−b, b+ 1] then
Scale g′It,t to [0, 1]
Update the estimated cumulative gain of arm It:
G˜It = G˜It +
g′It,t
pIt,t
end if
end for
Theorem 3.1. If DP-Λ-Lap is run with input a base bandit
algorithm Λ, the noisy reward g′It,t of the true reward gIt,t set
to g′It,t = gIt,t +NIt,t withNIt,t ∼ Lap( 1 ), the acceptance
interval set to [−b, b + 1] with the scaling of the rewards
g′It outside [0, 1] done using g
′
It,t
=
g′It,t+b
2b+1 ; then the regret
RDP-Λ-Lap of DP-Λ-Lap satisfies:
ERDP-Λ-Lap ≤ ERscaledΛ + 2TK exp(−b) +
√
32T

(3.1)
where RscaledΛ is the upper bound on the regret of Λ when the
rewards are scaled from [−b, b+ 1] to [0, 1]
Proof Sketch. We observed that DP-Λ-Lap is an instance of
Λ run with the noisy rewards g′ instead of g. This means
RscaledΛ is an upper bound of the regret L on g
′. Then, we de-
rived a lower bound onL showing how close it is toRDP-Λ-Lap.
This allows us to conclude.
Corollary 3.1. If DP-Λ-Lap is run with EXP3 as its base al-
gorithm and b = lnT , then its expected regret ERDP-EXP3-Lap
satisfies
ERDP-EXP3-Lap ≤ 4 lnT

√
(e− 1)TK lnK
+ 2K +
√
32T

Proof. The proof comes by combining the regret of EXP3
(Auer et al. 2003) with Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.2. DP-Λ-Lap is -differentially private up to
round T .
Proof Sketch. Combining the privacy of Laplace Mechanism
with the parallel composition (McSherry 2009) and post-
processing theorems (Dwork and Roth 2013) concludes the
proof.
3.2 Leveraging the inherent privacy of EXP3
On the differential privacy of EXP3 (Dwork and Roth
2013) shows that a variation of EXP3 for the full-information
setting (where the agent observes the gain of all arms at
any round regardless of what he played) is already differ-
entially private. Their results imply that one can achieve
the optimal regret with only a sub-logarithmic privacy loss
(O(√128 log T )) after T rounds.
We start this section by showing a similar result for EXP3
in Theorem 3.3. Indeed, we show that EXP3 is already dif-
ferentially private but with a per-round privacy loss of 2. 1
Our results imply that EXP3 can achieve the optimal regret
albeit with a linear privacy loss of O(2T )-DP after T rounds.
This is a huge gap compared with the full-information setting
and underlines the significance of our result in section 3.1
where we describe a concrete algorithm demonstrating that
the optimal regret can be achieved with only a logarithmic
privacy loss after T rounds.
Theorem 3.3. The EXP3 algorithm is:
min
{
2T, T · ln K(1− γ) + γ
γ
, 2(1− γ)T + 2
√
2 lnT
T
}
differentially private up to round T .
In practice, we also want EXP3 to have a sub-linear regret.
This implies that γ << 1 and EXP3 is simply 2T -DP over T
rounds.
Proof Sketch. The first two terms in the theorem come from
the observation that EXP3 is a combination of two mecha-
nisms: the Exponential Mechanism (McSherry and Talwar
2007) and a randomized response. The last term comes from
the observation that with probability γ we enjoy a perfect
0-DP. Then, we use Chernoff to bound with high probability
the number of times we suffer a non-zero privacy loss.
We will now show that the privacy of EXP3 itself may
be improved without any additional noise, and with only a
moderate impact on the regret.
On the privacy of a EXP3 wrapper algorithm The previ-
ous paragraph leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to
obtain a sub-linear privacy loss with a sub-linear regret while
using the original EXP3. Here, we will prove that an existing
technique is already achieving this goal. The algorithm which
we called EXP3τ is from (Dekel, Tewari, and Arora 2012).
It groups the rounds into disjoint intervals of fixed size τ
where the j’th interval starts on round (j − 1)τ + 1 and ends
on round jτ . At the beginning of interval j, EXP3τ receives
1Assuming we want a sub-linear regret. See Theorem 3.3
an action from EXP3 and plays it for τ rounds. During that
time, EXP3 does not observe any feedback. At the end of the
interval, EXP3τ feeds EXP3 with a single gain, the average
gain received during the interval.
Theorem 3.4 borrowed from (Dekel, Tewari, and Arora
2012) specifies the upper bound on the regret EXP3τ . It
is remarkable that this bound holds against the m-memory
bounded adaptive adversary. While in theorem 3.5, we show
the privacy loss enjoyed by this algorithm, one gets a bet-
ter intuition of how good those results are from corollary
3.2 and 3.3. Indeed, we can observe that EXP3τ achieves a
sub-logarithmic privacy loss of O(√lnT ) with a regret of
O(T 2/3) against a special case of the m-memory bounded
adaptive adversary called the switching costs adversary for
which m = 1. This is the optimal regret bound (in the sense
that there is a matching lower bound (Dekel et al. 2014)).
This means that in some sense we are getting privacy for free
against this adversary.
Theorem 3.4 (Regret of EXP3τ (Dekel, Tewari, and Arora
2012)). The expected regret of EXP3τ is upper bounded by:
√
7TτK lnK +
Tm
τ
+ τ
against the m-memory bounded adaptive adversary for any
m < τ .
Theorem 3.5 (Privacy loss of EXP3τ ). EXP3τ is(
4T
τ3 +
√
8 ln(1/δ′) Tτ3 , δ
′
)
-DP up to round T .
Proof. The sensitivity of each gain is now 1τ as we are using
the average. Combined with theorem (3.3), it means the per-
round privacy loss is 2Tτ . Given that EXP3 only observes
T
τ
rounds, using the advanced composition theorem (Dwork,
Rothblum, and Vadhan 2010) (Theorem III.3) concludes the
final privacy loss over T rounds.
Corollary 3.2. EXP3τ run with τ = (7K logK)−1/3T 1/3
is (, δ′) differentially private up to round T with δ′ = T−2,
 = 28K lnK +
√
112K lnK lnT . Its expected regret
against the switching costs adversary is upper bounded by
2(7K lnK)1/3T 2/3 + (7K logK)−1/3T 1/3.
Proof. The proof is immediate by replacing τ and δ′ in The-
orem 3.4 and 3.5 and the fact that for the switching costs
adversary, m = 1.
Corollary 3.3. EXP3τ run with τ =
(
4T+2T ln 1δ
2
)1/3
is (, δ) differentially private and its expected regret
against the switching costs adversary is upper bounded by:
O
(
T 2/3
√
K lnK
(√
ln 1δ

)1/3)
4 Experiments
We tested DP-EXP3-Lap, EXP3τ together with the non-
private EXP3 against a few different adversaries. The privacy
parameter  of DP-EXP3-Lap is set as defined in corollary
3.2. This is done so that the regret of DP-EXP3-Lap and
EXP3τ are compared with the same privacy level. All the
other parameters of DP-EXP3-Lap are taken as defined in
corollary 3.1 while the parameters of EXP3τ are taken as
defined in corollary 3.2.
For all experiments, the horizon is T = 218 and the number
of arms is K = 4. We performed 720 independent trials and
reported the median-of-means estimator2 of the cumulative
regret. It partitions the trials into a0 equal groups and return
the median of the sample means of each group. Proposition
4.1 is a well known result (also in (Hsu and Sabato 2013;
Lerasle and Oliveira 2011)) giving the accuracy of this estima-
tor. Its convergence is O(σ/√N), with exponential probabil-
ity tails, even though the random variable x may have heavy-
tails. In comparison, the empirical mean can not provide
such guarantee for any σ > 0 and confidence in [0, 1/(2e)]
(Catoni 2012).
Proposition 4.1. Let x be a random variable with mean µ
and variance σ2 <∞. Assume that we have N independent
sample of x and let µˆ be the median-of-means computed
using a0 groups. With probability at least 1 − e−a0/4.5, µˆ
satisfies |µˆ− µ| ≤ σ√6a0/N .
We set the number of groups to a0 = 24, so that the
confidence interval holds w.p. at least 0.995.
We also reported the deviation of each algorithm using the
Gini’s Mean Difference (GMD hereafter) (Gini and Pearson
1912). GMD computes the deviation as
∑N
j=1(2j − N −
1)x(j) with x(j) the j-th order statistics of the sample (that
is x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x(N)). As shown in (Yitzhaki and
others 2003; David 1968), the GMD provides a superior
approximation of the true deviation than the standard one.
To account for the fact that the cumulative regret of our
algorithms might not follow a symmetric distribution, we
computed the GMD separately for the values above and below
the median-of-means.
At round t, we computed the cumulative regret against the
fixed oracle who plays the best arm assuming that the end
of the game is at t. The oracle uses the actual sequence of
gains to decide his best arm. For a given trial, we make sure
that all algorithms are playing the same game by generating
the gains for all possible pair of round-arm before the game
starts.
Deterministic adversary. As shown by (Audibert and
Bubeck 2010), the expected regret of any agent against an
oblivious adversary can not be worse than that against the
worst case deterministic adversary. In this experiment, arm
2 is the best and gives 1 for every even round. To trick the
players into picking the wrong arms, the first arm always
gives 0.38 whereas the third gives 1 for every round multiple
of 3. The remaining arms always give 0. As shown by the
figure, this simple adversary is already powerful enough to
make the algorithms attain their upper bound.
2Used heavily in the streaming literature (Alon, Matias, and
Szegedy 1996)
Stochastic adversary This adversary draws the gains of
the first arm i.i.d from Bern (0.55) whereas all other gains are
drawn i.i.d from Bern (0.5).
Fully oblivious adversary. For the best arm k, it first
draws a number p uniformly in [0.5, 0.5 + 2 · ε] and gen-
erates the gain gk,t ∼ Bern (p). For all other arms, p is drawn
from [0.5−ε, 0.5+ε]. This process is repeated at every round.
In our experiments, ε = 0.05
An oblivious adversary. This adversary is identical to the
fully oblivious one for every round multiple of 200. Between
two multiples of 200 the last gain of the arm is given.
The Switching costs adversary This adversary (defined at
Figure 1 in (Dekel et al. 2014)) defines a stochastic processes
(including simple Gaussian random walk as special case) for
generating the gains. It was used to prove that any algorithm
against this adversary must incur a regret of O(T 2/3).
Discussion Figure 1 shows our results against a variety
of adversaries, with respect to a fixed oracle. Overall, the
performance (in term of regret) of DP-EXP3-Lap is very
competitive against that of EXP3 while providing a signif-
icant better privacy. This means that DP-EXP3-Lap allows
us to get privacy for free in the bandit setting against an
adversary not more powerful than the oblivious one.
The performance of EXP3τ is worse than that of DP-
EXP3-Lap against an oblivious adversary or one less pow-
erful. However, the situation is completely reversed against
the more powerful switching cost adversary. In that setting,
EXP3τ outperforms both EXP3 and DP-EXP3-Lap con-
firming the theoretical analysis. We can see EXP3τ as the
algorithm providing us privacy for free against switching cost
adversary and adaptive m-bounded memory one in general.
5 Conclusion
We have provided the first results on differentially private
adversarial multi-armed bandits, which are optimal up to loga-
rithmic factors. One open question is how differential privacy
affects regret in the full reinforcement learning problem. At
this point in time, the only known results in the MDP setting
obtain differentially private algorithms for Monte Carlo pol-
icy evaluation (Balle, Gomrokchi, and Precup 2016). While
this implies that it is possible to obtain policy iteration al-
gorithms, it is unclear how to extend this to the full online
reinforcement learning problem.
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Figure 1: Regret and Error bar against five different adversaries, with respect to the fixed oracle
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